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Review of Management Control Systems in 
Their Organizational and Environmental Context: 
Managerial Perspective and Control Typology 
Introduction 
Research on management control systems in their organizational and environmental context has been 
advocated for the past thirty years (e.g., Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Hopwood, 1978; Chenhall, 
Harrison, & Watson, 1981; Otley, 1984; Otley, Broadbent, & Berry, 1995; Chenhall, 2003). Reviews 
of theoretical premises of management control systems (Merchant & Simons, 1986; Otley et al., 
1995; Whitley, 1999) and specialty topics, such as the use of budgetary criteria in performance 
evaluation (Briers & Hirst, 1990; Hartmann & Moers, 1999) and the effects of national culture on 
management controls (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999), have appeared. However, comprehensive up-to-
date reviews of the role of management controls in their organizational and environmental context in 
contemporary organizations are not available. Yet, such research is important, as they can help 
researchers and practitioners understand the circumstances under which specific management 
controls are, or are not, effective. 
Management control as a specialized field of management has evolved during the past four decades. 
Management control was defined by Anthony (1965, cited in Anthony, 1988, p. 190), in a traditional 
manner, as "the process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used effectively 
and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's objectives". Efficiency is generally 
understood to be concerned with achieving given results with minimum resources and effectiveness 
with attaining organizational objectives. Although this definition appears to be concerned with 
organizational factors, such as strategy and resource usage, it positions management control as a 
middle-management function. As such, it considers strategy and objectives as given and operational 
task controls outside the domain of management control. However, Anthony's definition has been 
criticized for its emphasis on accounting-based controls and for its exclusion of the planning and 
operations functions, as well as, environmental influences (Machin, 1983; Lowe & Puxty, 1989; 
Emmanuel, Otley, & Merchant, 1990; Otley et al., 1995). The exclusion of planning results in a 
short-term focus, with no regard for the fact that, for long-term success and survival, it is necessary 
for organizations to anticipate and actively seek new opportunities and to adapt to their environment 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Trist, 1976). Furthermore, the exclusion of operations ignores 
nonfinancial controls, which are necessary for the control of day-to-day operational activities. Given 
these limitations, management control, in essence, becomes indistinguishable from management 
accounting.1 
A more balanced and comprehensive approach to management control is reflected in the definition 
proposed by Lowe (1971, p. 5), who defined management control systems as follows: 
I 
A system of organizational information seeking and gathering, accountability, and feedback designed to ensure 
that the enterprise adapts to changes in its substantive environment and that the work behaviour of its employees 
is measured by reference to a set of operational sub-goals (which conform with overall objectives) so that the 
discrepancy between the two can be reconciled and corrected for. 
Lowe's definition emphasizes the overall control necessary for successful adaptation by organizations 
to their environment. In addition to embracing conventional controls, it also recognizes planning, 
feedback, and necessary corrective actions as integral elements of effective management control 
systems, as well as, nonfinancial controls and the behavioural implications of controls as important 
considerations in effective control processes. This comprehensive organizational approach is more 
flexible and, therefore, more relevant to contemporary organizations, which are generally leaner, 
flatter, smaller, and operate in increasingly competitive and uncertain environments (Otley, 1994). 
The organizational approach, which is grounded in social psychology rather than strictly in 
economics, has been adopted as the basic premise in many theoretical articles and textbooks (Lowe & 
Machin, 1983; Chua, Lowe, & Puxty, 1989; Emmanuel et al., 1990; Otley, 1987; Berry, Broadbent, 
& Otley, 1995). Relying on this broader conceptualization of management control, Otley et al. 
(1995), in their review of the development of management control research, called for research 
recognizing, not only the organizational context of management control systems, but also the 
environment in which organizations operate. 
Research on management control systems in their organizational and environmental context has 
typically entailed a theoretical foundation based on contingency theory (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; 
Gordon & Miller, 1976; Hayes, 1977; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978; Otley, 1980; Tiessen & 
Waterhouse, 1983). Contingency theory is based on the premise that no single best or universalistic 
management control system exists, but that an appropriate system depends on various organizational 
and environmental factors. Otley and Wilkinson (1988) in particular warned that simple contingent 
models are inadequate, because they ignore many essential attributes of effective control systems and 
overall organizational effectiveness. Consequently, they developed a minimum contingent framework 
that focuses on overall organizational control. This framework, in addition to incorporating both 
accounting and nonaccounting controls, is also concerned with organizational objectives and strategy, 
as well as, other contextual and external factors that may affect overall organizational effectiveness. 
As such, this framework represents a balanced and pragmatic approach, capable of providing 
guidance for the design of management control systems. Although not without criticism as theory 
conceived to justify inconsistent and contradictory findings (e.g., Otley, 1980; Otley & Wilkinson, 
1988; Chapman, 1997; Fisher, 1998), contingency theory can provide significant insight into the 
antecedents and consequences of management control systems. In addition, although some 
reservations have been expressed by critical theorists (Lowe & Machin, 1983; Chua et al., 1989; 
Lowe & Chua, 1983)2, it is plausible to assume from the pragmatic managerial perspective that the 
primary objective of management control systems is to help existing managers achieve their 
organizational objectives. 
This comprehensive analytical review study extends previous research by focusing on different types 
of management controls, by incorporating several contextual factors, and by highlighting the role of 
management controls in performance management in contemporary organizations. N o known study 
has attempted to evaluate the literature with respect to both the contextual factors and the types of 
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controls simultaneously. Consistent with Lowe's (1971) definition, this study adopts the managerial 
perspective. Consequently, the scope of the study encompasses the elements of planning, i.e., 
feedforward control, and the evaluation of actual performance against plans, i.e., feedback control, as 
a basis for taking necessary corrective actions. However, it excludes a complex and diverse body of 
literature with sociological and ideological underpinnings (Tinker, Merino, & Neimark, 1982; Lowe 
& Machin, 1983; Chua, 1986; Chua et al., 1989; Macintosh, 1994) in order to limit the scope of this 
work to a reasonably manageable size. This paper consists of three main sections: context of 
management controls, types of management controls, and conclusions and future research 
opportunities. 
Context of Management Controls 
The context in which management controls operate can affect the appropriateness of different types 
of controls. Controls operate within the unique situational settings of organizations, which, in turn, 
operate within their broader environment. Examples of research studies that have examined various 
organizational and environmental factors are reviewed in this section and summarized in Table 1. For 
the purposes of this review, organizational factors are defined as elements internal to organizations 
over which organizations can exercise a reasonable degree of control, whereas environmental factors 
are external forces that are largely uncontrollable by organizations at least in the short term. The 
Table also classifies the studies by the types of controls and by the level of the study. The typology 
developed by Merchant (1985b, 1998) is used to classify controls, and it is discussed in detail in the 
next section. N o known study has attempted to evaluate the literature using this framework. The level 
of the studies is classified as individual, unit, and organizational, depending on the level of the 
relationships with which the studies are primarily concerned.4 Although the level of the study has 
been addressed previously, no clear consensus has been reached as to the most appropriate level. 
Finally, the Table also outlines the primary research method, the variables studied, and the major 
findings of each study. 
Only empirical studies that have investigated the use or effectiveness of management control systems 
in different organizational and/or environmental contexts are included in Table 1, although relevant 
theoretical studies may also be discussed in the analyses, as appropriate. Significant further theory 
development or refinement based on the empirical results reported is also mentioned, as applicable. 
In essence, the studies included in Table 1 examine the use or usefulness of different control system 
characteristics in different contexts5, and/or outcomes of management control systems in different 
contexts. Outcomes, in turn, can include performance at managerial, unit, and organizational levels, 
as well as, behavioural outcomes, such as job satisfaction and job-related tension. Although most 
studies included come from well-known accounting and management journals, the Table is not 
necessarily exhaustive.6 Nevertheless, the studies included provide abundant typical examples of 
research on management controls in their organizational and environmental context. The remainder 
of this section reviews some key studies that have focused on the organizational and environmental 
contexts of management control systems. 
[Table 1] 
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Organizational Context 
Organizations are unique entities consisting of people, physical resources, systems, and structures, all 
of which collectively provide management controls their organizational context. Organizational 
factors specifically discussed in this section are: structure, size, strategy, systems, individual 
characteristics, and ownership. Strategic planning establishes broad organizational goals, and 
organizational structure outlines the formal organizational relationships, as well as, provides a basis 
for establishing responsibility and accountability relationships. Furthermore, organizational size and 
individual characteristics can influence the types of management controls that are appropriate and 
feasible, and the existing systems can provide further opportunities or constraints for implementing 
controls. Finally, the nature of organizational ownership can pose limitations for effective 
management controls in some organizations. All of these factors can either facilitate or hinder the 
effective design and use of management controls. 
Structure, Size, and Strategy 
Structure, size, and strategy have been identified as important and interdependent contextual factors 
affecting management controls by several researchers, e.g., by Bruns and Waterhouse (1975), 
Merchant (1981, 1985c), Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), and Waterhouse and Svendsen (1998). 
After Bruns and Waterhouse obtained some early evidence on the relationships between management 
control systems, particularly budget controls, organizational structure, and size, Waterhouse and 
Tiessen further theorized that management controls may be contingent on organizational structure, as 
different types of controls m a y be appropriate under centralized and decentralized structures. Some 
empirical evidence exists to support this proposition. For example, Chenhall and Morris (1986) found 
that more aggregated and integrated information was useful in decentralized organizations than in 
centralized organizations. Brownell (1985) found a relationship between functional differentiation 
and the use of participative budgeting, with participation being more effective in research and 
development than in marketing functions. Mia and Chenhall (1994) discovered a stronger association 
between the use of broad management accounting systems ( M A S ) and performance in marketing than 
in production functions. Merchant (1981) found that formal administrative budgeting processes 
related to improved performance in large organizations, which are quite often decentralized, but 
informal interpersonal processes improved performance in small organizations, which are often 
centralized. Hoque and James (2000) reported that larger organizations used balanced scorecards 
more extensively than small organizations. Chenhall (2003) considered size as an important 
contextual factor, but noted that size has not often been explicitly studied, as most studies have been 
conducted only in relatively large organizations. 
Of the three factors, strategy is the most frequently studied factor. For example, Merchant (1985c) 
concluded that the effects of controls can vary depending on strategy and be stronger in businesses 
with growth strategies. Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) further extended this line of inquiry to 
encompass reward systems and found that subjective long-term criteria, but not short-term criteria, in 
determining managers' bonuses enhanced or hampered effectiveness depending on subunit strategy. 
Simons (1987) showed that prospector companies emphasized forecast data, tight budget goals, and 
output monitoring, but that defender companies emphasized rewards based on budget achievement 
and stable control systems. Waterhouse and Svendsen (1998) reported some fit between nonfinancial 
performance measures and strategic priorities in the areas of operations and environmental issues, but 
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a great need for improvement in the areas of innovation and external stakeholder relations. Van der 
Stede (2000) found that the units with differentiation strategy, as well as, more profitable units, were 
subject to less rigid budget controls and higher budgetary slack. Malina and Selto (2001) found the 
balanced scorecard to be effective for controlling strategy, but discovered tension between top and 
middle management about its use as communication, control, and evaluation tool. Lillis (2002) 
argued that when performance measures conflict, looser controls and multiple measures can facilitate 
strategy implementation. Baines and Langfield-Smith (2003) found that increasingly competitive 
environment increased focus on differentiated strategies. Jermias and Gani (2004) concluded that the 
units with product differentiation strategies used both output controls and behavioural controls more 
intensively than the units with low-cost strategies. Bisbe and Otley (2004) discovered that the 
interactive use of management control systems promoted product innovation only in low-innovation 
firms, whereas it hindered innovation in high-innovation firms. These studies provide significant, 
although not conclusive, evidence on the importance of strategy in the design of effective 
management control systems. 
Information Systems 
The sophistication of accounting and other information systems and the manner in which information 
produced by such systems is used are also key considerations in effective management control. These 
systems must produce relevant and timely information for various decision making and control 
purposes in a cost-effective manner, and such information must be used prudently in order to 
encourage desirable behaviours and to discourage dysfunctional behaviours. The extant systems 
research has focused, to a large extent, on budget control systems. Early studies were mainly 
concerned with the behavioural and motivational effects of budgets and budget participation (Argyris, 
1952; Stedry, 1960; Schiff & Lewin, 1968; Hofstede, 1968; Searfoss & Monczka, 1973; Swieringa& 
Moncur, 1975). Subsequent studies further examined budget use in organizations, suggesting several 
antecedents and consequences of budget systems (Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Bruns & 
Waterhouse, 1975), as well as, general characteristics of management accounting and budgeting 
systems (Gordon & Narayanan, 1984; Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Merchant, 1981,1985a; Williams et. 
al, 1990; Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1991; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Gerdin, 2005). 
In particular, the apparently contradictory findings of Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978) with respect 
to the perceived effects of budget-constrained evaluative style, led to a series of studies proposing 
contingent factors, such as responsibility structure and uncertainty (Hirst, 1981, 1983; Brownell, 
1982; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Hirst, 1987; Govindarajan, 1984; Dunk, 1989; Brownell & Dunk, 
1991; Lau, Low, & Eggleton, 1995; Ross, 1995; Otley & Pollanen, 2000).7 For example, Otley 
(1978), and later Brownell (1982), suggested that budget-based measures of performance may be 
more appropriate in profit centres than in cost centres. This proposition was supported by a larger 
proportion of nonaccounting styles found in cost centres by Hopwood (1972) and Brownell (1982) 
than in substantially independent profit centres by Otley. However, Brownell's study has been 
criticized on methodological grounds (Briers & Hirst, 1990; Vagneur & Peiperl, 2000; Otley & 
Fakiolas, 2000), but insufficient research has been carried out in an effort to validate these findings 
and methods. Overall, the available evidence comes from studies focusing on some narrow, albeit 
important, topics and has been methodologically challenged. Therefore, the appropriate role of 
accounting and other information systems in effective management control is still far from being 
resolved. 
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Individual Characteristics 
Individual characteristics, such as leadership style, the locus of control, professional orientation, and 
reputation are internal qualities of individuals that can also affect the appropriateness of management 
controls. Individuals possess different degrees of such inherent qualities, which can also be shaped to 
a certain extent by organizational policies and peer pressure. Argyris (1952) and DeCoster and 
Fertakis (1968) suggested that leadership style can influence the budgetary pressure exerted by 
superiors, and Ansari (1976) implied that leadership style can also interact with systems design 
characteristics. Subsequently, Hopwood (1974b), in an empirical study, found that the structure-
oriented leadership style was associated with the budget-constrained evaluative style, which, in turn, 
was associated with job-related tension.8 Although this finding is consistent with the proposition of 
DeCoster and Fertakis, it was not confirmed by Merchant (1985c). More recently, Otley and Pierce 
(1995) found that the leadership style characterized by high (low) structure and low (high) 
consideration was related to the highest (lowest) level of dysfunctional behaviours, and that these 
relationships were moderated by environmental uncertainty. 
With respect to the locus of control, Brownell (1981) reported budgetary participation to have a 
positive impact on performance of "internals", w h o generally believe that they can exert significant 
influence over their o w n lives, but a negative impact on performance of "externals", w h o feel that 
their lives are greatly determined by chance, luck, and fate. This result was also confirmed by Frucot 
and Shearon (1991). A s to reputation, W e b b (2002) found that possessing a reputation for budget 
accuracy is associated with lower budget slack. Finally, professional orientation accompanied with 
administrative controls in bureaucratic organizations can result in role conflict (Kahn et al., 1964) due 
to differing professional and organizational norms and values (Aranya & Ferris, 1984; Abernethy & 
Stoelwinder, 1995). Abernethy and Stoelwinder found that such conflict can be reduced by 
minimizing output controls, and that reduced conflict had a positive effect on job satisfaction and 
performance. Overall, some evidence, albeit limited, exists on the importance of individual 
characteristics in management control systems design. 
Ownership 
Although the basic concepts of management control apply to both private and public organizations, 
management control in public organizations is generally limited by characteristics, such as 
ambiguous objectives, fixed revenues, and difficulties in measuring outcomes. Under these 
circumstances, planning becomes primarily a political process with a short-term focus, and often 
involves extensive negotiation and bargaining (Henley, Holtham, Likierman, & Pernn, 1986; 
Anthony & Young, 1994; Wildavsky, 1975, 1992). Furthermore, cost centres are typically the only 
possible responsibility structure for accountability purposes due to the lack of profit orientation 
(Anthony & Young, 1994). Consequently, financial control in the public sector is essentially limited 
to budget-based controls focused on allocating fixed resources, authorizing expenditures, and 
ensuring balanced budgets.9 Nevertheless, budgets are also commonly used for performance 
evaluation purposes due to the lack of other more appropriate bases (Otley, 1987). 
However, emphasis on budgetary criteria in evaluation, particularly when combined with 
incrementalism and other short-cut methods commonly used to faciUtate budget preparation in the 
public sector, has been observed to result in game behaviours, with possible dysfunctional 
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consequences (Wildavsky, 1975, 1992; Smith 1993). Although empirical evidence in the public-
sector context is rare, five notable examples are provided by Williams, Macintosh, and Moore (1990), 
Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1991, 1995), Smith (1993), and Abernethy and Brownell (1999). 
Williams et al. (1990) found that budgeting as a whole was related to departmental performance, but 
to different degrees in different task environments. Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1991) reported that 
the fit between budgeting, task uncertainty, and system goal orientation was associated with 
improved performance, and Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995) concluded that professionalism 
mitigated role conflict associated with administrative output controls. Abernethy and Brownell 
(1999) found that the interactive budget use can mitigate the disruptive performance effects of 
strategic change. Finally, Smith(1993) identified seven dysfunctional consequences of inappropriate 
use of performance indicators. Regardless of these examples of research in public organizations, very 
little comparative work between the public and private sectors and among the different types of 
public and nonprofit organizations exists. 
Environmental Context 
Beyond the organizational setting, there are also broader environmental factors, such as 
technological, economic, competitive, cultural, social, regulatory, and political influences, that affect 
organizations and also their management control systems.1 In one of the pioneering studies on this 
topic, Khandwalla (1972) recognized the impact of competitive environment on the design of 
appropriate management control systems. Modern organizations operate in the increasingly 
competitive global environment, characterized by rapid technological change, as well as, in political 
environment, subject to laws, regulations, and ideology of the governments in power. Furthermore, 
organizations have to be sensitive to the diverse cultural backgrounds of their customers, employees, 
and other stakeholders, as well as, to current social issues and trends. All these factors can create 
uncertainty, to which organizations must adapt in order to survive and prosper, although some control 
over them may be possible in the long run, e.g., through strategic renewal and lobbying initiatives. 
Uncertainty 
It has been widely recognized that uncertainty may complicate control system design. For example, 
Otley (1978), referring to economic uncertainty, suggested that increased emphasis on budget-based 
evaluative styles in managerial evaluation may be appropriate under tight, and presumably certain, 
economic conditions but not in more liberal and uncertain environments. A similar explanation was 
also proposed by Imoisili (1989) who, under tight economic conditions, found primarily accounting-
based evaluative styles. However, the tightness of economic conditions was not directly measured in 
either study, and it was only offered as one possible post hoc explanation for some apparently 
contradictory results. 
Uncertainty has more commonly been defined in terms of task uncertainty and environmental 
uncertainty. Several management control frameworks have been based on Perrow's (1967) 
technology dimensions (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978; Banbury &Nahapiet, 1979; Macintosh, 1981). 
According to Perrow, routine tasks, which have also been referred to as programmable, analyzable, 
and low-variety tasks, result in low task uncertainty, whereas nonroutine tasks, which have also been 
called nonprogrammable, unanalyzable, and high-variety tasks, result in high task uncertainty. In 
addition to Perrow's typology, broader conceptualizations of uncertainty by Thompson (1967), 
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Duncan (1972), and Galbraith (1977) also consider environmental influences. Thompson's concept of 
uncertainty incorporates the notions of repetitiveness, i.e., the frequency with which tasks are 
performed, and openness, i.e., the susceptibility of operations to environmental uncertainty. 
Accordingly, the tasks that are both nonrepetitive and open to significant outside influences are 
referred to as high-uncertainty tasks, and the tasks that are both repetitive and closed to significant 
outside influences are referred to as low-uncertainty tasks. A related concept is interdependence, 
which has been defined as task interdependence or organizational interdependence (Gerdin, 2005; 
Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000; Williams et al., 1990; Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Macintosh and Daft, 
1987). Furthermore, uncertainty has been defined in terms of predictability of key external factors by 
Duncan and in terms of availability of adequate information by Galbraith. 
With respect to uncertainty in management control research, it has been argued that budget controls 
and other accounting-based controls are most effective under the conditions in which routine tasks 
are performed and uncertainty levels are relatively low (Hayes, 1977; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978; 
Otley, 1978). O n the other hand, nonfinancial controls, such as personnel and behavioural controls 
and nonfinancial performance measures, could be more effective under the conditions of high 
uncertainty (Abernethy & Brownell, 1997; Davila, 2000; Chenhall, 2003). However, the 
conceptualization and measurement of uncertainty in different studies have been inconsistent. For 
example, Gordon and Narayanan (1984), in a study on relationships between management control 
systems and environmental uncertainty, measured uncertainty in terms of predictability of various 
aspects of economic, technological and competitive environments; whereas, Chenhall and Morris 
(1986), in a study with similar objectives, measured it in terms of lack of environmental information, 
inability to assign probabilities to success and failure, and not knowing outcomes of incorrect 
decisions. In another example, Hirst (1983) theorized that accounting measures are inappropriate 
under environmental uncertainty, but used a measure of task uncertainty; whereas, Ross (1995) 
examined relationships between task uncertainty and performance measures, but used a measure of 
environmental uncertainty. In spite of such variations, some evidence exists for the potential 
detrimental effects of uncertainty. However, because of the conceptual and methodological 
interdependence of internal and external uncertainty, uncertainty is treated as an external factor in this 
study. 
Culture 
Culture is another environmental factor that has received significant attention in the management 
control literature. However, a clear distinction does not exist between organizational culture and 
national culture. Organizational culture, which is based on shared norms, values, philosophies, and 
organizational practices, has been viewed as a potential internal source of control that can be, at least 
partly, managed and manipulated (Langfield-Smith, 1995). It would, therefore, be best classified as 
an organizational factor. O n the other hand, national culture, which is based on characteristics unique 
to different nations, is largely uncontrollable by organizations. Although Hofstede's (1980,1997) five 
cultural dimensions11 have been criticized for ignoring sociological, anthropological, and historical 
perspectives (Harrison and McKinnon, 1999; Bhimani, 1999), they have been used almost 
exclusively in management control research to measure both national and organizational culture 
(O'Connor, 1995; Harrison, 1992, 1993; Merchant, Chow, & W u , 1995; Chow, Shields, & W u , 
1999). A rare recent exception is provided by Henri (2006), who captured organizational culture 
using two characteristics: flexibility and control orientation. 
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Some support exists for cultural differences in the use of management controls, although most studies 
have examined differences between national cultures, instead of organizational cultures. Harrison 
(1993) found in a study of Australian and Singaporean managers that participation accompanying 
budgetary criteria in evaluation was related to reduced tension regardless of culture, and that 
budgetary criteria was associated with reduced tension and increased job satisfaction in a culture 
characterized by high power distance and low individualism. Merchant et al.(1995) found less long-
term incentives being used in Taiwanese firms than in U S firms. C h o w et al. (1999) concluded that 
the Taiwanese national culture was an important determinant of management controls used by the 
Japanese, Taiwanese, and U S firms located in Taiwan, as these firms appeared to have adjusted their 
controls to reflect the prevailing controls and employee preferences in the host country firms. 
O'Connor (1995) found that, in the culture with low power distance, increased participation in budget 
setting was associated with reduced role ambiguity and improved superior-subordinate relations. 
Henri (2006) found that senior management teams used performance measures and P M S systems 
more strategically in Canadian firms with flexibility dominant organizational culture than in firms 
with control dominant culture. 
Types of Management Controls 
Management control systems consist of various control mechanisms, both financial and nonfinancial. 
Research on all types of controls that form a complete organizational control package is useful, as a 
different mix of controls may be available in and appropriate for different types of organizations, and 
as different controls may serve as substitutes for one another. In general, a control package, which is 
appropriately designed, implemented, and used, can serve as a useful planning, feedback, and 
motivational mechanism in effective organizational performance management. Additional work on 
control taxonomies and their relationships to management control systems was promoted, among 
other things, by Chenhall (2003) in order to promote further research in this area. Although several 
classifications of management controls exist (e.g., Hopwood, 1974a; Ouchi, 1977; Hofstede, 1981; 
Whitley, 1999; Simons, 1995, 2000)12, Merchant's (1985b, 1998) control framework is used in this 
study. Merchant's framework is considered to be the most appropriate framework for the purposes of 
this study, as it classifies controls by object of control, encompasses both financial and nonfinancial 
controls, and includes controls available through personnel, cultural, and social means. 
In accordance with Merchant (1985b, 1998), Table 1 classifies the types of controls into result, 
action, and personnel (cultural) controls. For the purpose of this study, the result controls category 
includes studies which examine financial and nonfinancial performance targets, for which managers 
can be held accountable, or surrogate measures for these targets. The action controls category 
includes rules, procedures, and physical constraints to protect property and data. The personnel 
(cultural) controls category includes corporate policies for hiring and retaining employees, as well as, 
self-control and social control by peers. Because the main objective of participative budgeting and 
standard setting, which are frequently studied topics, is to motivate and retain employees, they are 
classified as personnel controls in this study. O n the other hand, personal characteristics, such as 
leadership style and the locus of control, which are not directly controllable by organizations or their 
policies, are excluded from personnel controls and are treated as other organizational factors. For 
each control category, Table 1 also indicates examples of the typical control system characteristics 
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studied, e.g., budgetary criteria, performance measures, rewards, etc.13 Figure 1 summarizes the 
number of studies that have examined results controls, action controls, and personnel (cultural) 
controls, or combinations of the three categories. Each control category is discussed next, giving 
examples of control techniques and their effectiveness. 
[Figure 1] 
Result Controls 
Management controls referred to in the conventional management control literature are often results 
controls, as demonstrated graphically in Figure 1. The Figure indicates that 39 studies of the 65 
studies reviewed dealt only with result controls, and all others dealt with result controls in some 
combination with action and/or personnel controls. This category includes well-known studies that 
have examined the effectiveness of budget controls, such as Hopwood (1972; 1974b), Otley (1978), 
Bruns and Waterhouse (1975), Brownell (1982), Merchant (1981, 1984, 1985a), Govindarajan 
(1984), and Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), and numerous subsequent studies following this 
tradition. In general, result controls involve holding individuals accountable for planned results and 
rewarding them based on actual results. Result controls can be either financial or nonfinancial, as 
managers can be responsible for the achievement of predetermined financial targets, such as budgeted 
revenues and expenses, or nonfinancial targets, such as budgeted production and staff levels. 
Therefore, result controls inherently encompass the input, process, output, and outcome controls of 
the traditional process-oriented approach (Simons, 2000). Under this approach, managers can be held 
accountable for inputs, i.e., the quantity of resources used; processes, i.e., the efficiency of resources 
used; outputs, i.e., the quantity of work completed; and outcomes, i.e., the effectiveness or work 
completed. Although input and process controls do not directly relate to ultimate outcomes or results, 
they can serve as important indicators of results, particularly under the circumstances in which 
outputs and outcomes are difficult to measure. Effective result controls empower employees to take 
actions that are necessary for accomplishing the desired results and, therefore, can influence actions 
and outcomes by forcing employees to be concerned with the consequences of their actions. 
The implementation of effective result controls involves four stages: defining performance 
dimensions, setting performance targets, measuring performance, and providing appropriate rewards 
(Merchant, 1998). Performance dimensions represent key result areas in which good performance is 
essential, and performance targets set specific objectives for performance in each area. In order for 
the employees to focus on important tasks and behaviours, performance dimensions and targets must 
be congruent with the organization's strategy and objectives. Appropriate performance targets can 
enhance motivation by providing goals for which individuals can strive. The appropriate difficulty of 
performance targets has been discussed extensively in the goal setting literature (Locke, 1968; Tosi, 
1975; Locke & Latham 1990).14 Regardless of target difficulty, performance measurement provides 
processes and tools for assessing the extent to which performance targets have been achieved. 
Care should be exercised in selecting an appropriate number of representative financial and 
nonfinancial measures for each performance dimension, including input, process, output, and 
outcome measures, as a c o m m o n adage in performance measurement is, "What you measure is what 
you get" (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). Finally, rewards are an important final step in result control 
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systems in order to close the control loop (Merchant, 1989). Rewards should be designed to recognize 
and encourage good performance and to improve substandard performance. Such rewards can be 
financial, e.g., increased pay and bonuses, or nonfinancial, e.g., promotion, recognition, and 
additional responsibilities. Although research on performance measurement and incentives is still in 
its infancy, two studies provide some contradictory evidence.15 Smith (1993) identified seven 
dysfunctional behaviours associated with excessive reliance of performance measures. However, 
Scott and Tiessen (1999) found that team performance was positively associated with a variety of 
financial and nonfinancial performance measures, and further enhanced by participation in target 
setting and emphasis on team performance in compensation. Therefore, it appears that well-designed 
result controls can constitute a powerful control tool, particularly when combined with results-based 
rewards. 
However, result controls cannot be used effectively under all conditions. Although result controls can 
be applied at different levels, i.e., individual, group, and organizational levels, they are effective only 
when the desired result dimensions can be controlled to a considerable extent by the individuals in 
charge of them, and when results can be measured reasonably well. Therefore, they can be 
particularly useful for controlling organizations with established technology and certain 
environments, in which desired outcomes can be relatively easily measured (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 
1978; Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Hayes, 1977; Otley, 1978; Hirst, 1983; Govindarajan, 1984) and 
also operations in which outcomes are measurable but the knowledge of the transformation processes 
for achieving the outcomes is imperfect, such as in research and development operations (Ouchi, 
1977). Some evidence also exists indicating that result controls, such as tight budget controls, can be 
effective in centralized organizations and units (Brownell, 1985; Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Mia & 
Chenhall, 1994). On the other hand, result controls can also be effective in relatively independent 
responsibility centres, such as profit and investment centres in which the four necessary control 
conditions identified by Otley (1980) are met reasonably well.16 Result controls can also be more 
effective under defender strategies than prospector strategies (Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985; Van der 
Stede, 2000; Chenhall, 2003; Jermias & Gani, 2004). 
On the behavioural side, result controls can be effective for promoting motivation, as they can induce 
employees to produce desired results by ensuring that desirable actions also maximize employees' 
preferred rewards (Hofstede, 1980, 1997). However, result controls do not directly address personal 
limitations, such as the lack of skills and motivation (Merchant, 1985b, 1998) The use of result 
controls may also be limited in public organizations, in which it is usually difficult to implement 
performance-based rewards due to difficulties in measuring outcomes, and in professional 
organizations in which peer reviews may be perceived as the only appropriate form of evaluation by 
OdevTpn3if( TnnnT ? S t ° 6 l w i n d e r ' 1 9 9 * A b e ™ % & Brownell, 1997; Otley & Pierce; 1995 
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Action Controls 
Action controls are concerned with ensuring that individuals perform only desirable actions 
(Merchant, 1985b, 1998). The object of control is an action or activity rather than a result or outcome. 
Action controls are nonfinancial in their nature and intended to encourage or force certain desirable 
actions and discourage or prevent undesirable actions. A n underlying notion behind action controls is 
that desirable actions and activities can contribute indirectly towards the achievement of desirable 
results or outcomes. In this sense, action controls can serve as surrogates for result controls or as 
intermediate controls. However, as compared to result controls, action controls have the advantage of 
being proactive, i.e., primarily concerned with problem prevention, instead of being reactive, i.e., 
concerned only with problem detection and correction. 
Action controls can take four basic forms: behavioural constraints, preaction reviews, action 
accountability, and redundancy (Merchant, 1998). Behavioural constraints include physical 
constraints, such as locks, passwords, and limited access areas, as well as, administrative constraints, 
such as expenditure limits, restricted authority for decision making, segregation of duties, and rules 
and procedures. Behavioural constraints are intended to limit opportunities for potential unethical and 
fraudulent actions by employees and outsiders. Preaction reviews, on the other hand, subject plans to 
policy and procedural scrutiny and authorizations, possibly by several individuals or committees, 
before any action can be taken. Typical budgeting and capital budgeting processes are examples of 
preaction controls, as they provide a mechanism for the justification and approval of planned 
expenditures. Action accountability involves holding employees accountable for their actions in 
accordance with predetermined policies, procedures, and codes of conduct. Action accountability can 
be exercised as part of formal performance evaluation processes. Therefore, like result accountability, 
it can provide a mechanism for corrective actions. Finally, redundancy involves assigning more 
human or physical resources to critical tasks as a backup or precautionary measure than is ideally 
necessary, e.g., a standby operator or a backup power source or data, in order to allow a cost-effective 
and timely recovery of key operations in cases of major failures. Although action controls include 
traditional internal controls designed to safeguard assets against theft and waste, the concept of action 
controls is broader, as it also embraces action accountability. 
Like result controls, action controls are more appropriate in some situations than in others. Certain 
conditions are necessary for behavioural constraints, the most c o m m o n type of action controls, to be 
appropriate. These conditions are similar to those for result controls: the ability to identify desirable 
and undesirable actions, to reasonably control the occurrence of such actions, and to correct 
undesirable actions (Merchant, 1998). Therefore, behavioural constraints may be appropriate for 
simple tasks and processes, for which the three criteria can be met relatively easily, and also for 
complex tasks that can be divided into simple subtasks (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978). Behavioural 
constraints can also be highly valuable for operations in which safeguarding of assets or information 
is of utmost importance, e.g., in financial institutions. Although adequate preaction reviews and 
authorizations are important in any operations, they assume a critical role in organizations and 
activities in which outcomes are difficult to control after an event has occurred, e.g., in many 
discretionary public programs and research activities. Under these circumstances, action 
accountability is also important as intermediate control. Redundancy, on the other hand, is important 
for operations in which a failure of the critical system would cause undue delay or loss, e.g., in 
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hospital emergency rooms. Just as for ensuring the achievement of desired results, adequate 
performance measures are required for ensuring the achievement of desired actions. 
Only a few empirical studies provide evidence on the use of action controls in different contexts. For 
example, Merchant (1985c) found that discretionary program expenditures were affected by financial, 
headcount, procedural, and other controls, and that the effects of these controls varied depending on 
strategy, the chairman's control style, and the accounting treatment of expenditures. Macintosh and 
Daft (1987) discovered that under pooled interdependence, more standard operating procedures and 
less budget and statistical reports were used, whereas under sequential interdependence more 
statistical and budget reports than operating procedures were used. More recently, Jermias and Gani 
(2004) found that units with product differentiation strategy used both output controls and 
behavioural controls more intensively than units with low-cost strategy. Based on the scant empirical 
evidence, it is evident that additional research is required to examine the effectiveness of action 
controls, and their interrelationships with other controls, in different contexts. 
Personnel (Cultural) Controls 
Personnel (cultural) controls, like action controls, are nonfinancial in their nature, and they include 
not only controls available through personnel functions and processes but also cultural, social, and 
self-controls (Merchant, 1985b, 1998). For convenience, they are referred to as personnel controls in 
the remainder of this paper. Personnel controls thus include explicit policies and processes for hiring 
and retaining employees, organizational norms and values imbedded in organizational culture, social 
control exercised through group memberships, and self-control stemming from intrinsic motivation. 
Self-control is achieved primarily through self-monitoring based on personal values and beliefs and is 
founded on trust and the premise that self-respect and self-satisfaction, resulting from doing a good 
job, serve as adequate motivators for good performance. O n the other hand, social control, also called 
interpersonal control, is achieved primarily through mutual monitoring and rewarding of group 
members' behaviours by other members in accordance with group norms, rewards, and sanctions. As 
such, neither self-control nor social control can be purposely designed by organizations, beyond 
recruiting individuals with desirable attributes and providing them a supportive organizational 
climate. 
Control through personnel and cultural processes can be achieved through several methods. First, 
potential for control through personnel processes exists in the areas of selection, training, job design, 
and resources (Merchant, 1998). Selection and placement of employees m a y be the single most 
important element in an organization's control system. Finding individuals with proper education, 
experience, skills, attitudes, personality, and motivation to match the specific job requirements is 
prerequisite for a motivated and productive workforce. In order to address potential deficiencies due 
to personal limitations, training can be provided to new employees on job skills, organizational 
values, norms, and expectations, as well as, to existing employees as a professional and personal 
development vehicle. Properly designed jobs, in conjunction with adequate resources, provide 
qualified and motivated employees a high probability of successfully completing the assigned tasks 
and, at the same time, an appropriate level of challenge. Secondly, control through organizational 
culture may take the form of codes of conduct, reward systems, job rotation, physical and social 
arrangements, and support by top management (Merchant, 1998). Organizational norms and values 
13 
may be expressed in formal codes of conduct, which provide guidelines for expected behaviours and 
a mechanism for corrective actions or, alternatively, expressed informally simply as "the way we do 
things around here" (Peters & Waterman, 1982). In addition, job rotation and proper physical and 
social arrangements, such as open-concept offices, corporate slogans, and dress codes, can also 
enhance the socialization of individuals in organizations. Appropriate incentives can further reinforce 
conformance to organizational norms and values. Cultural control can also be facilitated through 
management behaviours that are consistent with organizational policies and procedures. 
Whereas action and result controls could be difficult to implement in some organizations, personnel 
controls are generally available in most organizations. For example, personnel placement, training, 
and rewards can be used by all organizations with employees to provide employees with the 
necessary direction, skills, and incentives to perform well (Merchant, 1998). Although personnel 
controls are implicitly part of any organization's personnel function, they can be relatively more 
important in some contexts than in others. They are especially useful in organizations with nonroutine 
tasks and uncertain environments (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978), e.g., in many public organizations, 
in which typical result and action controls may not be possible or feasible, as well as, in professional 
bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1979), in which highly educated professionals work relatively 
independently with little or no direct supervision. C o m m o n examples of personnel controls in these 
circumstances are the use of peer and self-evaluations and the delegation of decision making to 
committees. Personnel controls in general are also becoming increasingly more important in many 
contemporary organizations characterized by a relatively flat organizational structure and a wide span 
of control (Otley, 1994). Under all these circumstances, personnel controls may be used to 
compensate, at least partly, for the unavailability of other forms of control. However, unlike result 
and action controls, personnel controls cannot be used directly as a basis for result and action 
accountability, as they do not require specific behaviours or actions by employees. 
The most common examples of studies involving personnel controls come from the participative 
budgeting literature, although personnel controls are typically examined with result controls, and 
sometimes also with action controls, rather than alone. A large number of studies have investigated, 
among other issues, the effects of participation in budget and standard setting (Bruns & Waterhouse, 
1975; Brownell, 1981; Brownell, 1982; Brownell, 1985; Merchant, 1985a; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; 
Hirst, 1987;Dunk, 1989; Brownell & Dunk, 1991;Frucot&Shearon, 1991; Harrison, 1992; Lau et 
al., 1995; C h o w et al., 1999; Scott & Tiessen, 1999; Otley & Pollanen, 2000; Shields et al., 2000). 
Managers supposedly have a choice to institutionalize either the top-down (autocratic) or the bottom-
up (participative) approach into budget and standard setting processes. As such, the participative 
approach represents a management control tool, controllable by management, and thus falls under 
personnel controls. 
Another area of research that involves personnel controls is reward systems. As for participation, the 
objective of reward systems is to motivate employees to perform their duties in an effective and goal-
congruent manner. A s a potential behaviour-altering tool, rewards are a form of personnel control. 
Examples of studies which have explicitly or implicitly considered rewards include those by Simons 
(1987), Merchant et al. (1995), C h o w et al. (1999), Scott and Tiessen (1999), Shields et al. (2000), 
and Fullerton and McWatters (2002). Examples of studies that have considered some control 
elements from all three categories in a more integrative manner are the studies of Merchant (1985c), 
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Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995), Abernethy and Brownell (1997), and Groot and Merchant (2000). 
Merchant included financial, headcount, and procedural controls; Abernethy and Stoelwinder focused 
on performance targets, behavioural monitoring, and professional controls; Abernethy and Brownell 
examined professional controls and rules and procedures; and Groot and Merchant considered 
policies and procedures, approval processes, setting and monitoring performance targets, hiring and 
training processes, and rewards. Beyond these examples, very little attention has been paid to the 
relative importance of different types of controls in different types of organizations and contexts. 
Conclusions and Future Research Opportunities 
The literature review revealed that more research emphasis has been placed on organizational than 
environmental context, and that the effectiveness of different types of controls remains mostly 
unaddressed. In general, such research has been ad hoc and short-term focused, and concerned 
primarily with efficiency, rather than effectiveness, and with individual level factors, instead of 
organizational and systems level factors. Even for the areas for which a significant amount of 
empirical evidence exists, e.g., budget controls, such evidence has often been inconsistent, with very 
little integration and refinement of theoretical models based on new evidence. Furthermore, the 
existing research has almost exclusively focused on result controls, with very little attention paid 
either to the relative importance of different types of controls or to the extent and manner in which 
they are used in different types of organizations. 
The dominance of budget-based result controls can be understood by considering the context of the 
organizations studied. As most studies reviewed were conducted in manufacturing organizations, it is 
not surprising that financial result controls emerged as the main control type. Manufacturing 
organizations, particularly those operating in competitive mature industries, need to be highly 
concerned with cost control and profitability merely to survive. Although economic activity in the 
contemporary society has shifted from manufacturing to services, researchers have been slow to pay 
significant attention to other forms of controls that might be more relevant in nonmanufacturing 
organizations. Three examples of such work are the studies of Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995), 
Abernethy and Brownell (1997), and Otley and Pierce (1995), with the first two being conducted in 
the health care sector and the third in audit firms. As both types of organizations operate in 
professional environments in which personnel controls are expected to increase in importance, all 
three studies, in fact, examined some forms of personnel controls. Furthermore, as outcomes are 
difficult to measure in public and professional services, action controls also gain importance as a 
mechanism for controlling processes. This proposition is supported by the emphasis placed on action 
controls in both Abernethy and Stoelwinder's and Abernethy and Brownell's studies. In addition, 
Abernethy and Brownell considered the effects of uncertainty and found evidence of the effectiveness 
of personnel controls, as opposed to results and actions controls, under the conditions of high task 
uncertainty. 
The above-mentioned examples demonstrate that a fit between management controls and their 
context can have serious consequences in contemporary organizations, but such relationships are not 
understood well, yet. The existing findings can make only a modest cumulative contribution to the 
management control literature and provide only limited guidance for effective organizational 
performance management, particularly in public organizations. In an effort to address such research 
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voids, at least in part, four areas for possible further study are discussed in the remainder of this 
section: organizational context, environmental context, performance measurement and management, 
and methodology. 
First, two aspects of organizational context, in particular, are considered to benefit from further study: 
ownership and organizational culture. In spite of increasing demands for fiscal accountability and the 
early development of budget control theory in public organizations (Wildavsky, 1975), most studies 
have been conducted in the private sector, primarily in manufacturing organizations. However, as 
measurement issues seriously limit result controls in public organizations, other forms of control, i.e., 
action and personnel controls, m a y become relatively more important. It can be argued that a 
continuum of appropriate controls may, in fact, exist, as one moves from technology-oriented 
manufacturing businesses to service businesses and further to nonprofit and government 
organizations. The range of available controls becomes narrower, as technical, inventory, and profit-
based controls become progressively more limited. Therefore, result controls, particularly financial 
controls, may be relatively more important in manufacturing organizations, and personnel and action 
controls relatively more important in public organizations, with various service organizations in the 
middle benefiting from all three types of controls. Research in different public organizations, as well 
as, comparative research between the private and public organizations, the profit-oriented and 
nonprofit organizations, and the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing organizations would be useful 
in order to shed some further light on potential sectoral differences. In addition, organizational 
culture may also affect the effectiveness of controls in organizations, as individuals in positions to 
influence organizational culture m a y possess different management styles and value systems, 
tolerance for uncertainty, and views of power relationships. However, the impact of organizational 
culture, as opposed to national culture, remains essentially unaddressed. In such work, the 
conceptualization and measurement of organizational culture, beyond Hofstede's (1980, 1997) 
cultural dimensions, poses a serious challenge, as well as, an opportunity. Therefore, it appears that 
organizational context can offer some interesting future research opportunities. 
Secondly, critical accounting theorists argue that, in addition to technological and cultural 
environments commonly studied, social and political environments are also important considerations 
in designing management control systems. They are fundamentally concerned with power 
relationships and inequality in organizations and society (Cooper, 1981; Tinker et al., 1982; Lowe & 
Machin, 1983; Chua, 1986; Chua etal., 1989; Puxty, 1993; Macintosh, 1994; Lehman, 1996). Based 
on ideological underpinnings, critical theorists consider management controls to be affected by social 
and political forces, subject to power games and manipulation, not as neutral unbiased instruments 
that can be effectively designed and used. Consequently, they question the assumption of rationality, 
which is necessary for setting objectives and for determining and measuring outcomes effectively. 
More recently, gender issues have also been noted to warrant attention. For example, Maier (1999) 
argued that masculine characteristics, such as hierarchial relationships, task orientation, autocratic 
leadership, and competition, are valued and prevalent in typical organizations, leading to biased 
masculine substructures. Furthermore, Lehman (1996) maintained that accounting as a masculine 
discipline, is important for sustaining such masculine substructures. Regardless of these theoretica 
developments, little empirical research has been conducted beyond technological and cultural 
environments, particularly on the relative importance of the traditional and more critical issues in 
management control systems design. Although the two paradigms may remain irreconcilable due to 
16 
the inherent complexity of the issues involved, research effort in this area, nevertheless, could 
provide some guidance to control systems designers by raising awareness of pertinent critical issues. 
Third, the role of performance measurement in management control and effective organizational 
performance management deserves serious attention. Performance measurement can improve 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness by increasing the visibility of consequences of one's 
actions (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978) and, as such, serve as a mechanism for result and action 
accountability. Although budget-based financial information has commonly been used in 
performance measurement, effective organizational performance management requires tools and 
techniques beyond budget controls (Hope & Fraser, 1997), as financial measures imbedded in 
budgets may be effective only under certain conditions (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975). Such a broader 
perspective to performance measurement has also been advocated, e.g., by Otley (1994), Otley et al. 
(1995), Otley and Pollanen (2000), and Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993,1996a, 1996b). Kaplan and 
Norton's balanced scorecard, which emphasizes nonfinancial measures related to internal process, 
innovation, and customer perspectives, in addition to traditional financial performance measures, is 
thus consistent with such a broader approach. The internal focus of the balanced scorecard 
necessitates tailoring performance measurement systems to fit the specific circumstances of industries 
and organizations. Given this premise, effective performance measurement and management systems 
may, indeed, be even more complex and contingent on their organizational and environmental 
context than previously recognized. Therefore, Otley's caution that the development of a 
comprehensive performance measurement framework should be based on sound empirical research of 
existing practices in various contextual settings is well warranted. 
An issue related closely to performance measurement and management is the "tightness" or 
"looseness" of controls. Although this topic is mentioned in management control textbooks 
(Merchant, 1998; Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998), it has not been addressed directly in management 
control research, with the exception of literature dealing with the difficulty of budget targets 
(Merchant, 1990a; Merchant & Manzoni, 1989). Merchant (1998, p. 165) argued that tight controls 
are desirable, as they indicate "a high degree of assurance that people will behave as the organization 
wishes" and called for more research in this area. Although examples of tight controls were provided 
by both Merchant (1998) and Anthony and Govindarajan (1998), control tightness has not been 
concisely defined or measured, with the exception of an effort by Van der Stede (2001) to develop a 
measure of "tight budgetary control". Research on the appropriateness of budget and other controls 
becomes even more important given evidence that tight controls can be associated with negative 
behavioural consequences, such as data manipulation and suboptimal decisions (Hofstede, 1968; 
Wildavsky, 1975; Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Smith, 1993). 
Fourth, most studied have focused on individual, as opposed to organizational, characteristics and 
relied on the cross-sectional survey method. Merchant (1981, 1984) argued that a major reason for 
some inconsistent results may be the narrow focus on the lowest or individual level of analysis, e.g., 
managerial performance, as opposed to systems level of analysis, e.g., unit and organizational 
performance. Merchant suggested that, instead of concentrating on several individual variables, such 
as budget participation and evaluative style, it may be useful to consider a limited number of broad 
dimensions such as administrative and interpersonal uses of budgeting at the systems level. 
Consequently, Merchant proposed organizational and unit-level studies to enable a more general 
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examination of management controls in a broader context. The systems-based approach was 
considered particularly suitable for exploratory studies in large, complex organizations in which 
relationships in general may not be clear enough for formulating specific hypotheses. However, the 
literature review indicated that only a very few systems level studies exist in addition to a series of 
studies by Merchant (1981, 1984, 1985c). 
While the survey method continues to be important, particularly for comparative research with an 
established body of research using the same method, broadening research methods deserves 
consideration. Case studies in particular are considered appropriate for studying exploratory topics, 
for which hypotheses development rather than hypotheses testing per se is the main focus, and a 
longitudinal design for comparing results over time. Furthermore, the replication of even the basic 
studies on the organizational and environmental context of controls, i.e., strategy, structure, 
technology, and culture, is considered useful, as the existing evidence is still ad hoc and somewhat 
inconsistent. Replication is the cornerstone of scientific inquiry (Kerlinger, 1986; Lindsay, 1995; 
Otley & Pollanen, 2000; Lindsay & Hubbard, 2000); however, it has not generally been embraced in 
management control literature. Replication studies should include multiple variables and measures in 
order to minimize potential confounding effects of omitted variables and to validate key measures for 
which inconsistent results exist. Such research design would address, in part, criticisms directed at 
budget control research (Briers & Hirst, 1990) 
In conclusion, it is considered useful to broaden management control research to encompass overall 
organizational performance management. Such research entails the study of a balanced mix of 
controls that is essential for organizations to ensure the attainment of their objectives and to 
proactively manage their long-term strategy and performance under the prevailing environmental 
conditions. In particular, studies on the relative importance of different types of controls, e.g., result, 
action, and personnel controls, both financial and nonfinancial, in different settings would be 
beneficial. Similarly, research on the role of strategic performance measures would be valuable as a 
guide for overall organizational performance management. Careful attention also needs to be paid to 
broadening research methods and to ensuring both the reliability and validity of research findings. 
Such broader research objectives would ideally lead to comprehensive studies of the effects of control 
systems on external stakeholders and, ultimately, on the society at large. As new research evidence 
emerges in this still largely underresearched area, more specific relationships could be postulated and 
tested in an effort to develop more comprehensive performance measurement and management 
frameworks and practices. 
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Figure 1. Number of Studies by Type of Controls 
Result 
Controls 
39 
Action 
Controls 
20 0 
Personnel 
(Cultural) Controls 
0 
0 
Note: Controls are classified using Merchant's (1985b, 1998) control typology. 
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Notes 
1
 Chenhall (2003) noted that the terms management accounting (MA), management accounting systems (MAS), 
organizational control (OC), and management control systems (MCS) have sometimes been used interchangeably, 
complicating the interpretation of research findings. He defined M A as specific management accounting practices, 
M A S as systematic use of M A to achieve some goals, O C as the use of process control techniques, and M C S as the 
use of M A S , OC, and other controls, such as personal and social controls. 
2
 Critical theorists have questioned the separability of management controls from political and social influences, the 
validity of organizational goals, and the ability to purposely design effective control systems, e.g., Lowe & Machin, 
(1983), Chua et al. (1989), and Lowe & Chua (1983). 
However, Berry, Broadbent, and Otley (1995) noted that these relationships in reality are more complex, as 
organizational factors, such as structure and systems, and many environmental factors, such as laws and regulations, 
can be fundamentally affected by individual and societal values and ethics. 
The unit level also includes responsibility centre, team, and project structures used in a few studies. 
5
 Although several studies have used this approach (e.g., Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Waterhouse & Svendsen, 
1998; Moores & Yuen , 2001; Fullerton & McWatters, 2002), Chenhall (2003) questioned the validity of inferences 
to outcomes from such studies. 
The journals, from which the studies are drawn, are: Accounting Organizations and Society, The Accounting 
Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Behavioral Accounting Research, Journal of Management Accounting 
Research, Management Accounting Research, Australian Journal of Management, and British Journal of 
Management. 
7
 A comprehensive review of this literature is available, e.g., in Briers and Hirst (1990) and Hartmann (2000). 
8
 Stogdill (1963) identified two dimensions of leadership behaviour: consideration, i.e., concern with trust respect 
and subordinates' ideas, and feelings; and structure initiation, i.e., concern with clear and detailed responsibilities 
communication channels, and procedures. 
9
 However, some optimism exists in that this situation may be slowly changing due to recent initiatives by public 
organizations to adopt a wider range of management tools, such as accrual accounting. For example, a significant 
number of senior Canadian governments use, or planning to use, the accrual accounting basis for their planning, 
budgeting, and reporting documents ((The) Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2004, xiii). 
^ST^J^V"? i" enVir°nmental factor' as °PP°sed ^ an organizational factor, is subject to 
^ ^ ^ a ^ ^ T i ^ ^ T T °r8anizations Constitutes - organizational factor, in accordance with 
question i a lea J ^ echli }' ^ " ^ f ""^ ™tiateS °Utside organizations, unless the organization in 
^ ^ - -hnolog, Therefore, for the purposes of this 
luX^mZ^12^1fZaSi°T ^ " foll°WS: masculi-ty/femininity (concern with gender roles, 
^ J ^ t X ^ ^ ^ ' af??nng)' individuali^ollectivism (concern with own and 
threat ^ 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ •"**" <*«**» °f 
Confucian dynamism (concern with ^ C S S " " ^ *"" ****"*"* " d 
39 
12
 Hopwood (1974a) classified controls as administrative, social, and self-controls; Ouchi (1977) as behaviour and 
output controls; Hofstede (1981) as routine, expert, trial-and-error, intuitive, judgmental, and political controls; 
Whitley (1999) as bureaucratic, output, delegated, and patriarchal controls; and Simons (1995, 2000) as boundary, 
belief, diagnostic, and interactive controls. 
13
 The control systems characteristics are classified as follows: performance evaluation criteria, performance 
measures, performance targets, participation, budget control, financial control, rules and procedures, professional 
control, evaluation period, use of control information, control tightness, monitoring, reporting, goal congruence, 
strategic alignment, and rewards. These categories are consistent with the management control literature, but they are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive or exhaustive. For example, as performance evaluation criteria, particularly 
budget-based criteria, have commonly been studied, they constitute a separate category instead of being treated as 
part of more general budget control. Similarly, budget control and other financial controls are treated as separate 
categories. Nonetheless, the categories chosen demonstrate the major areas of focus in management control systems 
research. 
14
 In general, this literature provides some evidence that employees perform better under specific targets than vague 
targets and that, for optimum motivation, targets should be challenging but achievable by well-trained and motivated 
employees, although Merchant (1990a) and Merchant and Manzoni (1989) promoted highly achievable standards, 
supplemented with other incentives. 
15
 Although there are some other recent studies on the use of performance measures in executive compensation (e.g., 
Dilla & Steinbart, 2005; Roberts, Albright, & Hibbets, 2004; Ittner, Larcker, & Meyer, 2003; Lipe & Salterio, 2000), 
they are beyond the scope of this study, as they do not explicitly consider the organizational or environmental 
context or outcomes of performance measurement. 
16
 Otley (1980) identified the necessary conditions of control as follows: clear objectives, controllable and 
measurable outputs, a predictive model for determining the causes of discrepancies, and an ability to take corrective 
actions. Furthermore, he warned that serious deficiencies in meeting all four conditions, compounded by flaws in 
control design, implementation, and use, may result in goal incongruence and lead to dysfunctional behaviours and 
suboptimal decisions. 
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